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giving an exposition of the proof theory and guidelines OP how to specify and verify. 
Indeed, the sections on verification in both books are given ww largely to prototype 
tools. It is debatable whether these sections5 or those w other prototype tools, really 
belong in these books. If the books are just summaries of the SEDOS project, then 
they could starId as they are. Yet 4113 would want IQ read such summaries? What 
users require are comprehemible and comprehensive introductions, examples and 
reference manuals dealing with both specrfication and verification. They do not 
need to be told about the output formats from tools which have doubtless already 
been superseded. The tools devised for LOTOS in particular are quite extensive, 
but they deserve to be treated more as stimuli to other tool producers than as 
products; in these books they are likely just to be lost. 
To whom, then, can these books be recommended? People having some knowledge 
of network services and of concurrency calculi will be interested in the LOTOS 
book: it is the better edited and has the better subject of the two. People needing 
to apply either language will find more adequate guidance in these books than 
elsewhere. Yet if the books had been designed as unified texts, not just as collections 
of final ESPRIT reports, they could have been much more useful. 
Robert E. MILNE 
STL 
Harlow, United Kingdom 
The Emperor’s New Mind. By Roger Penrose. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
United Kingdom, 1989, Price JE20.00 (hardback), ISBN O-19-851973-7. 
The Emperor’s Old Hat 
Everyone knows that artificial intelligence has something to do witC@ ,;stting 
computers to think, and everyone knows that the whole enterprise is somewhat 
controversial. Advocates of AI claim that computers and robots will indeed one 
day be constructed of which it can plausibly be claimed that they have beliefs and 
goals and desires and intentions, perhaps even sensations and emotions; detractors 
disagree and say that no computer, relentlessly grinding through a list of machina 
instructions, could ever thereby have a mental life. The question is: how to nr~etd? 
How, given that artificial intelligence has not yet succeeded in Prodz&ng a thinking 
computer, might we assess the likelihood that, one day, it might? 
Basically, we must tackle two issues. First: what is it for a person (or anything 
else) to think? Second: what is it for a computer (or anything else) to ngn B program? 
Only if we can resolve these questions, will we have 2 clearlsr idea as to s*hether 
the goal of AI is a realistic prospect or just a forlorn hope_ ‘Yhesz, then are the 
issues that Roger Penrose addresses in his entertaining a& enlightsning book, The 
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Emperor’s New Mind. Penrose explains, for the intelligent general reader, the 
essential ideas behind computability theory, Giidel’s theorem, recent advances in 
neurophysiology and, after a breathtaking tour of physics from Newtonian 
mechanics to quantum gravity, Penrose’s own speculations on the physical processes 
which he takes to be fundamental to the nature of intelligence. Penrose then uses 
these very general theoretical considerations to conclude that the enterprise of 
artificial intelligence is doomed to futility. This is a book I would recommend to 
anyone interested in the foundations of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. 
Whether one agrees with its conclusions or not, one cannot help but admire the 
clarity and sweep of its exposition. 
To understand how Penrose reaches his conclusions, and to convey the basis of 
his approach, it will help to step back from the book and to examine for ourselves 
the pivotal notions of thought and program execution. 
Functionalism, the Church - Turing thesis, and artificial intelligence 
A critical-perhaps the critical-feature of the notion of program execution is 
the way it allows us to abstract away from irrelevant physical detail. Consider the 
process, in which I am now engaged, of typing this review into a text editor. As I 
type, the internal states of a host of wires and bits of silicon are changing in myriad 
ways. SF I delete some words from the file, then those internal states are again 
updated (perhaps reset ts wbt they were before). But the crucial point is that I 
need not know the details of these physical changes in order to use the machine: I 
need not knsw, for instance, the kinds of material substances the computer chips 
are made from, or the laws of physics governing their behaviour, or the physical 
state of f’he machine w%en it has read in the text from a file. I can happily think of 
the machir:e as containing 8 piece of text, and as inserting or deleting characters 
therein w therefrom as I type and backspace and retype, without knowing how 
these operations are performed. Similarly, in knowing that my computer is executing 
a Given program in LISP or C, I need not concern myself with what is happening 
to the physical devices being used to carry out the program’s instructions. Again, I 
can happily speak of it as adding or multiplying numbers contained in its memory, 
or as updating a ezertain pointer structure, without my having a clue as to the physical 
realisations of these operations. But of course, such talk of inserting or deleting 
text, of adding and multiplying numbers is really a metaphor: the computer doesn’t 
literally contain abstract hings like text or nurse ?--_= t -7% ( U-Z c&d any yrjyz&al object 
contain numbers?). Rather, it just gets put into physical states whi~b Q~J be mapped 
one-to-one onto the abstract states of containing text or numbers; and it performs 
physical operations which correspond, under that mapping, to the various abstract 
operations I speak of as inserting or deleting text, or addins or multiplying numbers. 
In describing the computer as performing such operations on abstract entities uch 
as text and numbers, I am manifesting my confidence in the existence of such a 
mapping between physical states of the computer and abstract states of the data it 
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is manipulating, But 1 need not trouble myself as to the detailed specification of 
that mapping. Just as long as there is one, I can carry on typing this review and 
excuting my C programs. 
There is a name in philosophy for this kind of talk, in which the operation of a 
physical device is described in terms of manipulations of abstract states with which 
its possible physical states are supposed to stand in one-to-one correspondence: 
such descriptions are calledfuncf~~nol~e~cripfions. The essence of functional descrip- 
tions-and of all talk about computer programs-is that they allow us to describe 
behaviour in terms of an abstract algorithm without worrying about its physical 
realisation. One final point concerning the notion of program execution. According 
to the Church-Turing thesis, if a given function can be computed at all, it can be 
computed by a Turing muchine and hence, memory limitations aside, by any standard, 
general-purpose computer. On the basis of the foregoing remarks concerning what 
it means to execute a program, the Church-Turing thesis can be formulated as a 
physical hypothesis: no physical object, it says, admits of a functional description 
according to which it is computing a function that cannot be computed, given 
sufficient time, by a Turing machine. The Church-Turing thesis, thus construed, 
will play a crucial part in the following discussion. 
Let us put computation to one side for the moment and focus now on rhoughf. 
Suppose I say of John that he thinks that it is raining. In making such an assertion, 
1 am committing myseif to predictions about John’s likely behaviout: for instance, 
that if John desires to stay dry, and knows about hats and umbrellas, he will very 
possibly take appropriate actions before going out. Now, for John to be disposed 
to behave thus, a certain amount of activity is required in his brain. But of course, 
I need not know the details of this brain activity in order to speak of John as 
thinking that it is raining: I led not know, for instance, the kinds of anatomical 
structures John’s brain is made from, or the laws of aeurophysiology governing 
their behaviour, or their physical state when John thinks that it is raining. And in 
general, I need not know about the detailed workings of John’s brain to describe 
John as as having this or that set of beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth, any 
more than I need to know about silicon chips to understand, in programming terms, 
what a word processor is doing. 
This general observation suggests the philosophical view known as jitnctionulism. 
According to funtionalism, psychological description-description of someone as 
having certain beliefs, desires, intentions and so forth-is functional description. 
That is, when we describe someone in psychological terms, we are attributins to 
that person a collection of states whose patterns of interactions arc spr:sitiei in 
certain complex, but nevertheless identifiable ways. Thus, for example, if we say 
that John believes that it is raining outside, we take it that this belief will interact 
with a desire to stay dry and with knowledge about hats and umbrellas to produce 
certain behaviour involving taking a hat or umbrella before going out. For John to 
realise this psychological description -i.e. for John actually to believe that it is 
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raining-his brain must be in a state which has the right pattern of interactions with 
other of his possible brain states (and with his external environment) to qualify as 
the belief that it is raining. But, as with program-talk, we need not concern ourselves 
with what these brain states are. All we need suppose for John to have beliefs and 
desires and intentions is that there exist possible states of his brain which an be 
mapped onto psychological state descriptions of believing it is raining, desiring to 
stay dry, etc. in such a way that the pattern of interactions between these physical 
states is consistent (or approximately consistent) with the pattern of interactions 
we expect between the corresponding psychological states. On this view, description 
of people as having beliefs, desires and intentions is just like description of computers 
in terms of the programming constructs they are processing. 
Now we can begin to see the link emerging between the philosophical doctrine 
of functionalism and the possibility of artificial intelligence. According to functional- 
ism, to credit someone with being in a given collection of psychological states is to 
credit him with being in physical states having certain patterns of interaction 
isomorphic to the (very complicated) patterns of interaction characteristic of the 
psychological states in question. And satisfying such a functional description is just 
a matter of computing various functions defined over the set of possible psychological 
states. It follows, then, on the relatively uncontroversial ssumption that people do 
sometimes have thoughts, that people’s brains do sometimes compute the requisite 
functions for them to be credited with having those thoughts. By the Church-Turing 
thesis, these functions can be computed by some Turing machine, and since it is 
possible, in principle, and ignoring memory limitations, to program a conventional 
computer to simulate any given Turing machine, a conventional computer could be 
programmed to simulate (or approximately to simulate) this Turing machine. Such 
a computer would then, ex hvpothes& have physical states that could be mapped 
onto psychological state descriptions in such a way that it thereby counted as being 
in the relevant psychological states-i.e. as having certain beliefs, desires, intentions, 
etc. Therefore, computers can have psychological states, and AI is possible. 
In other words: the philosophical doctrine of functionalism plus the empirical 
fact that people do have psychological states plus the empirical hypothesis of the 
Church-Turing thesis implies the possiblity of AI. So those who want to reject he 
very possibility, in principle, of AI, have three lines of attack open to them. The 
first strategy, and the most popular, is to reject functionalism, the thesis that 
psychological description abstracts away from physical realisation as dc*rilM= The 
second strategy is to deny that people (or any treat.: ;ts 01 entities j actually have 
psychological states. And indeed, there are those who have acioptea ih;; Pretty 
extreme view. (As Descartes once noted: there is no position SO absurd that one 
philosopher or another has not at one time embraced it.) The third strategy is to 
reject the Church-Turing thesis, the thesis that any computation that can be petfor- 
med at all can be performed by a Turing machine, and &ice by a conventionally 
programmed computer. Penrose’s book follows this third strategy. 
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Objections to arti@cial intelligence 
As 1 indicated above, many writers have rejected the foregoing equation of thought 
with program execution. At the most basic level, mere program execution has often 
seemed to offer an insufficient account of the subjective character of conscious 
expe&nce. How can a computer, applying a set of programming instructions to a 
stream of sensor input, experience the scent of roses, or see the redness of a sunset? 
How could a computer be fired with ecstasy or filled with dread, experience pain 
or sorrow or love or hatred? Even were a robot programmed to behave exactly as 
if it were having these experiences, that would be mere simulation, not to be mistaken 
for the real thing. In a word, so the objection has it, there is never anything it is 
like to be a computer; but there is necessarily something it is like to be a thinking 
conscious thing. Therefore no thinking conscious things are computers. 
The philosophical term for a subjectively characterised experience, or raw feeling, 
is quale. So we may dub the above objection, as one wit has put it, the curse of the 
gualia. It is a denial of functionalism, because it alleges that the subjective character 
of experience will forever be beyond the ken of functional explanations to account 
for. But it is a difficult objection to assess, since we lack any very good independent 
yardstick by which to evaluate the strong Al claim that a perfectly good simulation 
of thought is thought. Turing obviously regarded the objection as a poor one when 
he proposed his celebrated operational test of intelligence; others think it conclusive. 
But there is little that I can say about it here. 
Some detractors from the strong AI viewpoint focus not on sensations and 
emotions, but rather, on the higher-level cognitive functions with which AI has 
traditionally been pre-occupied. Take, for example, a computer program which 
takes stories as input and answers “comprehension” questions about those stories. 
However good the computer becomes at answering questions about stories set in, 
say, restaurants, it can never, merely by means of crunching through the millions 
of rules which have been fed into it, understand what a restaurant is, what goes on 
there, what it really is to have a meal, and so on. To be sure, if you ask the computer 
“What happens in a restaurant?’ it will dutifully type out “Patrons enter, sit at a 
table, order food from the waiter, eat it when it arrives, and pay.” But that’s just a 
piece of symbol-crunching-it doesn’t amount to understanding. The most promi- 
nent exponent of this objection is John Searle, who dramatizes the situation bqr 
means of the now-infamous Chinese room thought-experiment. Imagine that you 
are in a room whose only contact with the outside world is via TV &AX Biia Lr 
input, the other for output. Through the input slot pieces of paper arrive on which 
are inscribed Chinese characters. Whilst you do not understand any Chinese at all, 
you are however equipped with a large body of rules for manipulating the squiggles 
fed in through the input slot so as to generate further sets of squiggles which, when 
completed, you feed back through the output slot. These rules are so devised that, 
to the Chinese speakers outside the room, it looks as if you are producing apposite 
answers (in Chinese) to the Chinese questions which they earlier fed in through the - 
input slot. Yet, from your point of view, you are dealing with mere meaninglets 
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squiggles. And, as for the inhabitant of the Chinese room, Searle contends, so for 
a computer: mere manipulation of symbols, that is, mere program execution, cannot 
be a sufficient condition for understanding. So it is impossible to produce a machine 
which thinks (where thought presupposes understanding) merely by virtue of endow- 
ing it with the right program. 
Like the curse of the qualia, the Chinese room works by challenging functionalism, 
though this time in a way which is at least apparently backed up by some argumenta- 
tion. Unlike the curse of the qualia, the Chinese room has provoked a vast and 
sprawling global debate, both in the published literature, and via long, long entries 
on computer bulletin boards. Some have objected that if you really did answer the 
Chinese questions at the speed of the average Chinaman, then it is not so clear that 
you wouldn’t understand Chinese; or again that much of the force of the thought- 
experiment comes from the fact that the system inside the room has no perceptual 
input and output at all (think of how your appreciation of restaurants would be 
affected if you had been deaf, dumb, blind and numb from birth). But now is not 
the place to add to that debate. Penrose, who discusses the Chinese room objection 
in his first chapter, says he finds the argument “suggestive” but not “compelling”. 
However, it is clear that he sympathises with Searle’s fundamental intuition: that 
genuine undetslandirrg or insight, particularly, Penrose thinks, mathematical insight, 
cannot be a matter of executing a conventional computer program. For this proposi- 
se adduces another, more interesting argument. In expounding this 
argument, Penrose engages his reader in a clear and ejoyable discussion of Turing 
machines, computability theory and GGdel’s theorems. And I propose to duplicate, 
for purposes of criticism, the simpler parts of that material now. 
Penrose’s argument 
A Turing machine is an idealised device with a fixed program and a modifiable 
memory in the form of an infinite tape which is scanned one square at a time. The 
program instructions can read a symbol (either 1 or 0) from the tape, write a symbol 
to the tape, move the tape one square backwards or forwards, or branch on a test 
to another part of the program. There is also a halting instruction which terminates 
the computation. For our purposes, we may think of a Turing machine as having 
a single input in the form of a binary number written on the tape at the start of 
computation, and a single output in the form of a binary number v&err there at 
the end. Turing machines can of course be numb, :ed: that is, the progranr that a 
given Turing machine is running-with its instructions to read and wrne and move 
the tape and jump to other places in the program-can be coded as a single number. 
And one of Turing’s fundamental results was to show that there exists a Turing 
machine which can simulate the behaviour of any other Tuting machine, described 
by its program number. That is, there exists a generai-purpose computing machine, 
which can run any program. 
Suppose, then, that r is the number of a Turing machine, T. Since 7 is just a 
number, it is of course possible to use T as the input for the input to T itself'. And, 
in that case, T will either halt with some output, or continue running infinitely. Let 
us say, in the former case that T converges on self-input, and in the latter, that T 
diverges on sel/-input. Now, of all numbers x which number Turing machines, some 
will number Turing machines that converge on self-input, and others will number 
Turing machines that diverge on self-input. The question arises as to whether we 
can program a special Turing machine, call it H, which can tell which category any 
given Turing machine number x belongs to. Can we, that is, program a Turing 
machine to tell, of any numbered program, whether it will converge (i.e. terminate) 
on self-input? 
Turing’s demonstration that the answer is “no” can be illustrated by reductio ad 
absurdum. Suppose that the Turing machine H existed. Consider the program H* 
in Fig. 1. Since H* is a Turing machine, it will be coded by some number, VJ*. 
Question: does H* converge or diverge on self-input-i.e. on input q*- A little 
reflection suffices to show that either answer is contradictory. Let H* be given as 
input its own description II*. On the one hand, if H* terminated, then H must 
yield the answer “yes” (because it is given input q*), so that the left-hand branch 
is taken in Fig. 1, and H* does not terminate. On the other hand, if H* did not 
terminate, H must yield the answer “no” (because it is given input II*), so that the 
right-hand branch is taken in Fig. 1, and so H* does terminate. Contradiction. This 
disproves the possibility of the machine H, from which H* was constructed. This 
result is known as the undecidability of the halting problem: there is in principle 
no computer program capable of deciding, in general, whether any given program 
converges or diverges on self-input. 
LOOP HALT 
1 
Fig. 1. The Turing machine ff*. 
What has this got to do with the possibility of AI? Suppose that, as before H is 
a program which, when given a Turing machine number x, tries to decide whether 
the machine numbered by x converges or diverges on self-input. But now suppose 
that H itself occasionally gets stuck in infinite loops. Thus H, when it gives a result 
at all, does so reliably (never telling us that x is in the wrong category); but it does 
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not give a result for every input X, because it sometimes gets stuck in an infinite 
loop. Now consider again H* constructed as in Fig. I, but using the new H. What 
happens if H* is run on input q *7 Well, again a little reflection suffices to show . 
that H* does not terminate, because H itself does not terminate. This time, there 
is no contradiction, because we are not supposing that H works for all possible 
Turing machine numbers. 
However, a result does seem to follow which is even more startling than the 
previous one! We have just seen that, when fed with the number q*, both H and 
H* fail to terminate. Therefore H cannot determine whether H* (which is the 
Turing machine numbered by q*) converges or diverges on self-input, because H 
fails to terminate when given the number r) *. Yet, I have just established that H* 
diverges on self-input. But if AI is possible, then any thinking that I can do can be 
done by a Turing machine. Well then, let H in Fig. 1 be a Turing machine that 
duplicates my ability to decide whether Turing machines terminate on self-input. 
Then we have the following situation. On the one hand, a little reflection suffices 
to show that H cannot determine whether H* (which is the Turing machine 
numbered by r)*) converges or diverges on self-input, because H fails to terminate 
when given the number q*. On the other hand, in performing this reflection myself, 
I have determined whether H* converges or diverges on self-input (it diverges). 
This contradicts the supposition that H duplicates my ability to tell whether Turing 
machines halt on self-input. So I can decide something I could not decide if I were 
a Turing machine. So AI is false. 
Penrose introduces the above argument in terms of provability rather than the 
halting of Turing machines, arguing that the human mind cannot be duplicated by 
a computer program since it can outdo any computer program for proving theorems. 
The above argument seeks to show, rather, that the human mind cannot be duplicated 
by a computer program since it can outdo any computer program for testing whether 
other programs halt on self-input. But as Penrose himself asserts, the arguments are 
essentially the same in both cases. What the above argument purports to show is 
that, in determining whether Turing machines halt on self-input, the human mind 
transcends the power of any Turing machine because it can see of any Turing 
machine of the form depicted in Fig. 1 that it could not possibly terminate. Penrose, 
like others who espouse this line of argument, claims that the mind’s ability to see 
these things is related to its ability to understand what the relevant strings of symbols 
or program listsings reuNy mean, as opposed to mindlessly grinding through an 
algorithm. Thus we, reflecting on what it metin= ior $ &3 tWKil”rW? 6f3 hpUt q*, 
were able to decide that it could not terminate; and that, thinks Pehlas~, is in essence 
what a computer cannot do. Penrose sees this process, whereby we reflect on these 
meanings, as fundamental to the nature of mathematical insight, consciousness, and 
of intelligence generally. 
Once having provided this basic motivation for tbi;ilcing that the human mind 
transcends the limits of Turing computability, Penrose, very laudably, sets himself 
the task of explaining how this comes about. The better part of the book-in terms 
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of both length and quality-is taken up with an explanation of the physical and 
mathematical background to the quantum mechanical speculations which Penrose 
thinks lie behind this explanation. Briefly, Penrose believes that there exist certain 
arrangements of atoms called “quasicrystals”, which exhibit approximate sym- 
metries forbidden to true crystals. The relevance of quasicrystals to computability 
lies in the fact that, when quasicrystals grow, the atoms involved can be thought of 
as solving the mathematical problem of arranging themselves in a certain quasicrystal 
lattice. Now, it turns out that, for each atom, the “decision” as to where to position 
itself depends not only on the positions of its immediate neighbours but also on 
the positions of distant atoms, and there is a genuine puzzle about how the atoms 
manage to make this decision. Penrose speculates the answer to the problem of 
quasicrystal growth may be found in developments in quantum mechanics which 
he believes will need to be made in order to account for a variety of cosmological 
puzzles. And he then goes on to suggest that the physical processes involved may 
violate the Church-Turing thesis. And if there are some physical (quantum 
mechanical) processes which violate the Church-Turing thesis, then maybe some 
of those processes occur in the brain, where connections between neurons are 
formed, thus allowing the human brain (and hence the human mind) to do things 
that computers cannot do. 
Objections to Penrose’s argument 
Much of what Penrose says in his explanation of how the brain achieves these 
alleged feats of supracomputability s,by his own admission, controversial, uncertain 
and speculative. It is controversial whether quasicrystal growth really does require 
any exotic quantum mechanical explanation of non-local action (see the article 
“Quasicrystal Clear” in Scientijk American 262 ( 1) ( 1990) 11); it is uncertain whether, 
even if Penrose’s instincts about the kind of explanation required are correct, the 
quantum mechanical processes he wants to postulate really will turn out to violate 
the Church-Turing thesis; and it is speculative that such processes will turn out to 
be relevant o synapse formation in the brain. Not that there is anything wrong with 
controversy, uncertainty or speculation, of course. But it is worth bearing in mind 
that Penrose provides no really good independent grounds for believing in the 
supracomputability of the brain other than the argument considered in the previous 
section. And whilst one cannot help but admire the ingenuity behind Penrose’s 
positive speculations, it is by the arguments based on the Giidel and TV%? ~+z~t~ 
that that his case stands or falls. 
It has to be said, before proceeding, that the argument Penrose develops is 
well-known, and, it is fair to say, accepted by only a very few people working in 
the philosophy of mind and of mathematics. It was first proposed by John Lucas 
in the journal p3riloso@ry in 1951, and has since been criticised on a number of 
points, most notably by Paul Benacerraf in The Monist in 1967, as Penrose himself 
acknowledges. Moreover, I have to report that I could find nothing whatsoever in 
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7%e Emperot’s New Mrtd that advances the debate on this argument even a single 
step: everything of note here has been said already and (in my opinion) effectively 
rebutted. TO put it bluntly: it’s old hat. And if I am correct in my assessment that 
Penrose intends most of the weight of his case against AI to rest on this argument, 
then the proponents of AI can sleep easy. Penrose also tackles several auxiIiav 
issues concerning mathematical reality, consciousness, mathematical insight, and 
intelligence. I have to say that I was disappointed by this material also, much of 
which is supported by flimsy, hand-waving arguments and a sprinkling of anecdotes, 
some of them personal. To be sure, the introspective reports of an eminent 
mathematician are not to be dismissed lightly. But Penrose can’t just tell us what 
his little finger tells him: that’s not evidence. 
I do not propose to survey all the faults with which Penrose’s (or should I say 
Lucas’) argument has at one time or another been claimed to be riven. But for the 
reader interested in why it fails, I mention here just two salient problems. The first 
has to do with finiteness. The mathematical output of anybody, indeed of the whole 
human race, indeed, of all sentient creatures of the cosmos, is most probably finite. 
So, for that matter (though this is less clear), is the range of sensations which they 
can in their lives enjoy. If so, such output can certainly be reproduced by a Turing 
machine, since a gigantic look-up table would be all that is required. Of course, a 
look-up table may not be in practice feasible as a solution to the problems of AI. 
But that does not save Penrose’s argument, which is supposed to show that no 
Turing machine whatsoever can simulate human intelligence. Similar problems may 
apply to Penrose’s positive speculations concerning the mechanisms governing 
quasicrystal formation (or whatever, exactly, it is) in the human brain which underpin 
the brain’s supracomputability. The danger for Penrose is that, however physically 
puzzling, the problems of quasicrystal formation (or whatever) are all very finite 
and so could be solved by means of some look-up table, at least in principle- 
Finiteness is a great leveller in this matter. The mind a Turing machine? Nay: a 
finite state automaton! I cannot, of course, prove that the human mind or the possible 
range of its sensory inputs is finite in the relevant sense. But I do not see that 
Penrose can prove that it isn’t. 
Now for the second problem with Penrose’s argument. It is a good idea to think 
of that argument as involving a pincer movement. The first prong starts by taking 
whatever Turing machine H is supposed to enable us to decide whether Turing 
machines converge on self-input, and constructing ths larger Tu%g p3G5ne H* 
in Fig. 1. It then goes on to show that neither tk original machine H nor the 
augmented machine H * converges when fed with the description of H ‘- ‘file second 
prong proceeds by observing that, since H is the Turing machine -we use to tell 
whether Turing machines converge on self-input, and since we have just considered 
whether H* converges on self-input, and have answeired in the negative, H evidently 
just has been feed with the description of H”, and evidently just has terminated. 
So H both does and does not terminate when fed with the description of H*- 
Contradiction. 
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One problem here lies in the use of the phrase “the description of If*“. For H* 
has more than one description, and the apparent force of the argument depends on 
mixing up two quite different sorts of description. The usual assumption is that 
descriptions of Turing machines are coded as numbers, which can then be fed to 
other Turing machines able to reason about them. Coding Turing machines using 
numbers is of course equivalent to describing them using program listings, in form 
of a set of instructions in C or LISP. Now, the problem for Penrose’s argument is 
that the listing of a complicated program may well be very long. In particular, if 
my psychology can be encoded as a C program, I flatter myself that that program 
will be enormous. Bearing in mind that it takes me an afternoon to debug one page 
of C, there is little hope that I would be able tell whether this program converged 
on self-input. So the first prong of the argument just tells me for sure what I guess 
anyway on other grounds: that, given the description of my own psychology as a 
titanic computer printout, I could not tell whether that program, or some augmented 
version thereof, terminated on self-input (i.e. on being given its own program listing 
as input). 
But whilst Penrose’s first prong may succeed, the second fails. For in acknowledg- 
ing that the very argumentation of the first prong constituted an application of the 
program H, 1 must identify H as “the mechanism I use to determine whether Turing 
machines halt on self-input”, with H* then specified in terms of H. And such a 
description of H (and derivatively H’), is quite different from its program listing. 
Indeed, if H accepts descriptions of programs using indexical phrase such as “the 
mechanism 1 use to. . . ” , then Penrose’s argument takes on quite a different character, 
as we shall see. 
Suppose, then that what is fed into H* is not a program listing, but something 
like the description: “the mechanism depicted in Fig. 1, where H is whatever 
mechanism 1 use to determine whether mechanisms halt when given as input 
descriptions of themselves”. Does the argument still go through? Yes it does. 
Assuming the correctness of the mechanism H I use to determine whether mechan- 
isms halt when given descriptions of themselves, 1 can follow the first prong of the 
argument as before, to show that neither this mechanism H nor the mechanism H* 
terminates when given the above description of H* as input. And then I can follow 
the second prong when I see that, in having just followed the first prong, the 
mechanism H I use to determine whether mechanisms halt on self-input has just 
terminated given the above description of H* as input. 
But the trouble with this reconsttitued version of Penrose’s argur*,en: F+ :kIr-_ it 
now has nothing to do with the Church-Turing thesis! That is. the argument will 
work whatever kind of “mechanism” is substituted for H, even one that transcends 
the limits of Turing computability, even a device based on those quantum mechanical 
mechanisms Penrose believes to underly mathematical insight, nay, even Penrose 
himse& In the old version of the argument, where the program for checking whether 
other programs converge on self-input accepted its own input in the form of program 
listings, then it was reasonable to hope that a non-Turing device operating on 
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quantum mechanical principles might overcome its limitations, because (maybe) 
such a non-Turing device would lack any sort of description in terms of a program 
listing which could be fed into the machine of Fig. 1 to create a contradiction. But 
in the new version, where the mechanism for checking whether mechanisms terminate 
on self-input accepts descriptions of those mechanisms in indexical terms such as 
“the mechanism I use for . -7, then that hope is dashed. For that mechanism H 
can always refer to itself (and derivatively to Ff*) using such an index&l expression, 
so that the contradiction will go through as before. And that is true whatever the 
nature of the mechanism. To summarise: ither the programs are described in terms 
of a program listing, or else they are described indexically, using such phrases as 
“the program I use to . . .Y If the former, then the second prong of the argument 
does not work; if the latter, then the argument is not specific to Turing computability. 
Either way, the argument does not show what Penrose takes it to show, that the 
human brain can transcend the limits of Turing computability. 
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Strand: New Concepts in Parallel Programming. By Ian Foster and Stephen Taylor. 
Prentice Hall, Hemel Hempstead, United Kingdom, 1989, Price f 32.10 (paper- 
back), ISBN 0-13-850587-X. 
This book is intended as an introduction to Strand (Stream- and parallelism), a 
new commercially available concurrent logic programming language. Concurrent 
logic languages allow the development of concurrent programs using a logic pro- 
gramming paradigm. They are born from a new interpretation of Horn clauses, the 
process interpretation, with the aim to exploit the parallelism which is inside logic 
programs. According to this interpretation, an atomic goal can be viewed as a 
process, aconjunctive goal as a process network, and a logic variable shared between 
two clauses can be viewed as a communication channel between two processes. 
The main goal of Strand is to be simpler and more efficient han the other 
concurrent logic languages like Concurrent Prolog, PARLOG, GHC, and Delta- 
Prolog. For this, Strand uses a simple mechanism of matching ins of unification. 
Matching is different from unification because it 4~s~ i& assi nt of values to 
variables in a rule, but it does not allow the assignment of values z ;;?r iables in a 
process. 
The book suggests a programming style for Strand. The language is presented in 
a practical way. The authors assume abasic background in !ogic programming, and 
no comparisons are made with other concurrent logic !anguages. The main part of 
the book is devoted to the description of various programming techniques that can 
be used in Strand. Besides for programmers, it can be used as a textbook for a 
